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Abstract
In this article we contend that attempts to foster democratic education in the United 
States’ public schools rarely include mathematics class in meaningful ways. We 
begin with Dewey’s conception of democracy and then argue that current ways of 
thinking about mathematics do not provide adequate foundations for democratic 
mathematics education. Our reconceptualization of mathematics draws on Dewey’s 
uniquely humanistic philosophy of mathematics. We conclude with some implica-
tions of democratic mathematics education for school and society. Thus, this project 
seeks to blur the theory-practice dualism, developing a theoretical argument which 
draws sustenance from and seeks to contribute back to educational practice.
John Dewey, often referred to as the philosopher of American democracy 
(Sleeper, 1988), forwarded the idea that democracy is realized by the twin tenets of 
opportunities for full development of capacities for all and the concurrent demand 
of social responsibility from all. Dewey described education as growth and framed 
it within activity. Many working under the banner of democratic education cite 
Dewey as an influence.1 While the impact of democratic education proponents on 
American schooling can be debated, it is interesting to note that any influence the 
movement has had on schooling in general has been even less evident within the 
realm of mathematics education. Furthermore, those working in and around the 
realm of democratic mathematics education seem less likely to draw on Dewey for 
theoretical support. This is particularly interesting, given that Dewey cowrote a book 
on mathematics education early in his career. The Psychology of Number and its Ap-
plications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic, originally published by James A. McLel-
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lan and Dewey in 1895, has received relatively little attention from Dewey scholars, 
mathematics philosophers, and mathematics educators (Stemhagen, 2003). 
In a review of recent philosophical work in democratic education, Marginson 
(2006) asks a series of questions about the various projects, including: “how would 
they augment the formation of individual and collective democratic agency in edu-
cation, particularly in schooling . . . ?” (p. 208). In this article, we take Marginson’s 
question as a point of departure, sharpening its focus slightly, by bringing the ques-
tion to bear specifically on the mathematics class. We believe that current ways of 
thinking about mathematics do not provide an adequate foundation for a demo-
cratic mathematics education and propose a reconceptualization of mathematics 
that draws on Dewey’s uniquely humanistic philosophy of mathematics. 
The essay begins by framing Dewey’s more general democratic philosophy. 
Next, we explore the tendency for mathematics to be considered different in kind 
from other educational pursuits. Psychology of Number is considered, along with 
other works by Dewey, in order to depict a different way of thinking about math-
ematics education. We conclude by suggesting some implications for democratic 
mathematics education in mathematics class and on society writ large. One al-
gebra activity is presented in detail and a second is sketched; both offer potential 
examples of democratic mathematics education in action. Thus, this project is an 
attempt—in a Deweyan spirit—to blur the theory-practice dualism, offering a 
theoretical argument that draws sustenance from and seeks to contribute back to 
educational practice.
Dewey, Democracy, and Education
The Measure of Society
Dewey (1895) indicated that the human need to measure was rooted in the desire to 
have better and more efficient lives. His reputation as the philosopher of American 
democracy is tied to his exploration of the question: What is the measure of a good 
society? Dewey cautions against measuring social systems based on ideal societies 
that exist only in one’s head (1916). Instead, he finds that the measure of society is 
only beneficial in its pragmatic function. That is, desirable traits in existing soci-
eties must be identified and considered in order to improve upon the practice of 
other existing social groups. Dewey states, “in any social group . . . we find some 
interests held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and coop-
erative intercourse with other groups” (1916, p. 83). The standard for evaluation 
of social groups derives from the expression of traits related to internal cohesion 
and external interaction.
Dewey describes these two elements as they are found in democratic societ-
ies. Internal cohesion, in its best democratic expression, is present when societal 
direction emerges from multiple, varied points of common interest. External in-
teraction is exemplified as groups previously isolated from one another (owing to 
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class, education, ideology, nationality, etc.) are able to interrelate and reconstitute 
their social habits based on these relationships. Dewey explains:
The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first sig-
nifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common 
interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as 
a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction 
between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could keep up 
a separation) but change in social habits—its continuous readjustment 
through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. And 
these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically consti-
tuted society. (1916, p.86)
The very meaning and value of democracy is found in the development of indi-
vidual capacity and the subsequent demand that citizens give back to society. The 
development of individual interests with consideration to others promises to break 
down existing social barriers:
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in 
space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that 
each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the ac-
tion of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the 
breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which 
kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. (p. 87)
Measuring Educational Philosophy against the Aims of Democracy
Dewey (1916) sought to further clarify his understanding of the importance of 
individual development and social responsibility and the problem of blind activ-
ity. Toward this aim, he juxtaposed his democratic philosophy of education with 
Plato’s desire to discover and develop individual capacity to efficiently employ it 
in society. Dewey was concerned that an emphasis on efficiency and the prescrip-
tive, mechanical treatment of education would lead to Platonic class divisions and 
enslave individuals who could not understand or control the aims of their learn-
ing and work. After presenting democratic education in contrast to Platonic ideals, 
Dewey set out to assess education practice in the early twentieth century. His mea-
surement of industrial education against democratic values led him to a treatment 
of means and ends that may provide some insight into how one might approach 
mathematics education. 
Dewey (1916) posited the idea that democratic communities with egalitarian 
values are inextricably devoted to systematic, public education. He contrasted the 
educational needs of such societies with the needs of other types of societies:
A society marked off into classes need be specially attentive only to the 
education of its ruling elements. A society which is mobile, which is full of 
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channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it 
that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability. Oth-
erwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught 
and whose significance or connections they do not perceive. The result will 
be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves the results of 
the blind and externally directed activities of others. (p. 88)
Dewey used Plato’s social and educational philosophy as a foil to demo-
cratic education. He acknowledged Plato’s contribution to educational philosophy 
in that Plato showed the importance of the links between the cultivation of one’s 
natural abilities and the health of a society. However, he also critiqued the limits 
of the Platonic project. Dewey agreed that the primary aim of education is to help 
the individual discover her natural equipment, foster and develop it, and use it in 
effective ways. He took issue with Plato’s prescriptive educational model because 
in it, native capacities became limiting factors that inhibited interrelations and the 
reconstitution of social habits.
Plato envisioned a group of philosophers who would sort people into groups 
according to intelligence. People dominated by appetite would provide manual la-
bor. Educated individuals with diminished capacity for reason would be guardians 
of the peace and citizen-subjects. Finally, those who had the highest kind of educa-
tion (abstract, universal knowledge) would lead and govern (1974). 
Dewey identified similarities between the educational philosophy at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and the Platonic project. He believed that the 
educational philosophy and psychology that accompanied industrialization at the 
turn of the century also focused on efficiency and reinforced class divisions. Like 
the Platonic project, this mechanical treatment of education was at odds with the 
democratic values that he championed. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Dewey (1916) criticized narrow views of intelligence that focused on efficiency and 
productivity to the exclusion of social factors. Capitalists controlled the aims of in-
dustry and provided workers with training focused on efficient skill development, 
devoid of social interrelation. Dewey considered activity detached from aims, under 
the purposes of another, to be tantamount to slavery: “[Slavery] is found wherever 
men are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable, but whose service they 
do not understand and have no personal interest in” (1916, p. 85). In other words, 
the native capacities of workers were being developed and provided a social return, 
but their lack of self-determination and purpose perpetuated class divisions and 
undermined democratic principles.
Dewey’s definition of slavery cannot be separated from his understanding 
of ends and means. In reaction to empiricism, Dewey indicated that blind activity, 
disconnected from any end, does not forward understanding. In the same breath, 
Dewey (1929) cautioned against the rationalist’s idealization of ends as separate 
from or superior to means:
Regulation of conditions upon which results depend is possible only by 
doing, yet only by doing which has intelligent direction, which takes cog-
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nizance of conditions, observes relations of sequence, and which plans and 
executes in the light of this knowledge. The notion that thought, apart from 
action, can warrant complete certitude as to the status of supreme good, 
makes no contribution to the central problem of development of intelli-
gent methods of regulation. It rather depresses and deadens effort in that 
direction. That is the chief indictment to be brought against the classic 
philosophic tradition. Its import raises the question of the relation which 
action sustains to knowledge in fact, and whether the quest for certainty 
by other means than those of intelligent action does not mark a baneful 
diversion of thought from its proper office. (p. 36)
Dewey’s warnings about mechanical education that disconnected ends and 
means were not limited to education for industrial efficiency and production. Dewey 
indicated that “[t]he notion that the ‘essentials’ of elementary education are the three 
R’s mechanically treated, is based upon ignorance of the essentials needed for real-
ization of democratic ideals” (1916, p. 192). The “essentials” to which Dewey refers 
are the connections between thought and its proper office, a connection between 
means and ends. The mechanical treatment of education presupposes that the end 
of education is social-capital return and earned income. Assuming that education’s 
end is to “make a living” or provide social return detached from significant action 
robs the individual of a meaningful existence because the end to which he works 
is unrecognizable to him.  
Dewey, of course, articulated a different aim for a robustly democratic educa-
tion that does not limit intelligence to a mechanical participation in means based 
on ends that lie outside of the activity. Instead, the aim of education must be present 
within existing situations. Intelligent activity allows the learner to modify actions 
based on identified ends. This is important for democratic societies, because only in 
the understanding of the original aim can the individual reflect upon existing con-
ditions and change the target. Rigid, external aims prevent educators and students 
from understanding that ends are experimental, ongoing, and inextricably related 
to particular contexts. Furthermore, they are future means, not ultimate ends. By 
freeing activity through the legitimate use of aims, the potential for changing con-
ditions exists (1916). Personal initiative and adaptability are key components of an 
education that measures up to democratic principles. This philosophy of education 
provides a foundation for the readjustment of social habits, the second element that 
points to democracy.
Dewey uses the imagery of a hunter to illustrate the freeing of activity, the 
continuum of ends and means. The hunter does not practice shooting a target with 
good marksmanship as his ultimate aim. Instead, this end is actually the activity 
that leads to another end, shooting a mobile rabbit. The kill at the end of the hunt 
only marks another point in the activity that leads to a meal. He goes on to say that 
“[e]very means is a temporary end until we have attained it. Every end becomes a 
means of carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved” (1916, p. 106). 
The underpinning of mechanical education is that there are ultimate, ab-
stract ends that can be externally imposed.  According to Plato, these abstract and 
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ultimate ends are the highest forms of education and become the domain of lead-
ers and governors. This rational form of epistemology, which purports a hierarchy 
of knowledge and class, separates knowledge from activity and citizens from one 
another. To Dewey, in a vibrant democracy, such rigid ends are undesirable and, 
ultimately, untenable. Furthermore, a robust education should not focus on pre-
determined ultimate ends, but rather cultivate a student’s ability to propose aims, 
construct means to achieve those ends, and evaluate when ends need to be adjusted 
in light of changing circumstances. While Dewey’s way of thinking about the ends 
of education has had some impact on many facets of the curriculum,2 mathematics 
education has remained largely resistant to such ways of thinking. We argue that 
this is mostly related to the widespread belief that mathematical knowledge is differ-
ent in kind than other forms of knowledge. Given this belief, Dewey’s link between 
democracy and education does not appear to extend to mathematics education. 
We contend that this situation is unfortunate. Prior to exploring how a Deweyan 
conceptualization of mathematics education opens the door for an explicit math-
ematics-democracy link, we first sketch the predominant ways of thinking about 
mathematics that render it resistant to its meaningful democratization.     
Current Ways of Thinking about Mathematics as Insufficient 
Foundations for Democratic Mathematics Education
There is wide acknowledgement of the social dimensions of most school-related 
knowledge. In science, a post-Sputnik concern for relevant, applicable science ed-
ucation coupled with some philosophical insight (e.g., the work of Kuhn, Rorty, 
and others) has led to changes in the teaching and learning of science as a school 
subject (Boudourides, 2003). Science class has become a place where students play 
the role of fledgling scientists. History class has similarly undergone fundamental 
changes— spurred by technological advances and disciplinary shifts in how the 
enterprise of history is conceived (Ford, 2006). 
We do not want to overstate the case and claim that proponents of construc-
tivist, progressive education have been able to overcome the stultifying effects of 
über-mechanical, fixed-aim-oriented accountability systems such as NCLB and its 
various state-level standards and high-stakes testing regimes. What we are claiming 
is that while such systems do restrict the ability of democratically oriented educa-
tors to implement meaningful and effective pedagogies, mathematics education 
has an added layer of resistance to democratic education. Hence, mathematics 
education never enjoyed the sort of metamorphosis that has taken place in other 
content areas. Instead, there exists a split. The unexamined, common-sense version 
of mathematics as objective, neutral, and extra-human has fostered resistance to 
the aforementioned pedagogical shifts that have taken place in other subject areas. 
Those working to implement constructivist reforms in mathematics education 
have had to work against stubborn and longstanding understandings of the dis-
cipline as dealing with absolutes. Consequently, reformers have postured against 
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this absolutism by offering constructivist versions of mathematics that emphasize 
its subjectivity and fallibility. The “math wars” have been ongoing for years, pit-
ting traditionalists—those calling for more rigor and a “back to basics” approach 
to mathematics education—against reformers—those advocating a child-centered, 
applied approach to mathematics education. 
The math wars are about more than just teaching methods and curriculum 
decisions. Pronounced differences as to how the nature of mathematics is con-
ceived undergird this split. Absolutists tend to view mathematics as certain, per-
manent, and independent of human activity. Constructivists, on the other hand, 
focus on the ways in which humans actually create mathematical understandings 
and knowledge.3 
The math wars are germane to this project because we contend that both 
absolutism and constructivism—while each makes important contributions to 
the philosophy of mathematics and mathematics education—ultimately fail as 
philosophical foundations for a democratic mathematics education. Absolutism 
captures mathematics’ unique stability but does so at the expense of recognition 
of its human dimensions. Constructivism, on the other hand, tends to encourage 
acknowledgement of the human dimensions of mathematics but, in doing so, seems 
unable to account for the remarkable stability and universality of mathematical 
knowledge. Perhaps as importantly, this ideological stalemate has blocked efforts 
to humanize the teaching and learning of the subject. This unfortunate situation 
is, we argue, a main contributor to the state of affairs that has made mathematics 
education and democratic education mutually exclusive endeavors.4 How can it be 
that a main aim of American schooling is to foster the development of individuals 
capable of and interested in democratic participation and that this ethos is, at least 
theoretically, represented in almost all facets of the school day, yet it is conspicu-
ously absent from mathematics class? In the end, we believe that this contributes to 
missed opportunities in mathematics education and in the wider project of educa-
tion for democracy. For this reason, we next turn to the “philosopher of American 
democracy” and his ideas about the nature of mathematics in order to reconcep-
tualize school mathematics.  
Dewey’s Pragmatic Mathematics and Philosophy of 
Mathematics Education
As we noted, Dewey’s ubiquitous presence in philosophy of education and, even to 
a certain extent, in education writ large does not carry over to the philosophy of 
mathematics education. This lack of influence is puzzling, as Dewey’s (1895) co-au-
thored mathematics education book, The Psychology of Number and its Applications 
to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic, described a philosophically and psychologically 
based approach to mathematics education. 
Dewey’s exploration of the psychological processes involved in an individual’s 
coming to know mathematics provides a point of entry for human elements into 
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a discipline (philosophy of mathematics) that has frequently worked to explain 
mathematics in nonhuman, antipsychological terms.  
Psychology has often been viewed as something to be overcome or ignored in 
philosophical work, as there is a worry that mental processes act as an impediment 
to understanding the “reality” of the external world. This traditional philosophical 
conception of psychology posits a distinct line between the mental and the physi-
cal. Dewey saw this polarization as overly static and inaccurate and so he worked 
to mediate between tendencies that focus solely on mental or physical aspects of 
existence. One way he combated this way of thinking was to employ psychology in 
a nontraditional manner. 
Dewey’s psychology is at the core of his general epistemological project. To 
Dewey, knowledge, belief, and psychology are inextricably linked. Dewey (1910) 
explains these connections in outlining his notion of “immediate empiricism”: 
I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise is fearsome; 
it really is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That is what it is 
experienced as being. But, when I experience the noise as a known thing, 
I find it to be innocent of harm. It is the tapping of a shade against the 
window, owing to movements of the wind. The experience has changed; 
that is, the thing experienced has changed not that an unreality has given 
place to a reality, nor that some transcendental (unexperienced) Reality 
has changed, not that truth has changed, but just and only the concrete 
reality experienced has changed. . . . This is a change of experienced exis-
tence effected through the medium of cognition. (p. 230)
In Deweyan terms, the world is as it is experienced and, subsequently, an 
individual’s psychology is central to all experiential endeavors. Accordingly, phi-
losophers are obligated to include psychology in any attempts to understand expe-
rience in any but the most reductive way. Many philosophers posit psychology as a 
barrier to logic, obscuring the contents of the logical, a priori realm. The Deweyan 
conception of logic and psychology, in light of human activity, describes psychol-
ogy and even logic merely as modes by which we undertake the act of living our 
lives. Psychology encompasses the mental processes by which we actually think 
(and live). Dewey (1967) goes so far as to humanize logic as he sees it as originating 
from the recognition, emulation, and eventually the formalization of particularly 
fruitful methods of inquiry. 
With regard specifically to mathematics, Dewey conceived of number as 
fundamentally transactional in nature—that is, it resides within the processes of 
mathematical activity. The understanding and use of number comes about in the 
wake of much experience in the empirical world and also after a great deal of ratio-
nal and abstract thought. Thus, although the sensory input to which we are exposed 
is laden with raw information as to the multiplicity of things in nature, it does not 
necessarily follow that the notion of number is present. On this point, Dewey wryly 
notes, “There are hundreds of leaves on the tree in which the bird builds its nest, but 
it does not follow that the bird can count” (McLellan & Dewey, 1895, p. 23).
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Dewey’s use of psychology extends beyond merely coming to know math-
ematics and actually find a place in his understanding of the creation of mathemat-
ics. Note that it “finds a place” in his understanding of where mathematics comes 
from—it does not determine mathematics, as some radical constructivists argue 
(von Glasersfeld, 1991). Dewey saw the development of mathematics as arising 
from the need to solve genuine human problems. Hence, Dewey’s philosophy of 
mathematics provides both stability in the form of pragmatic constraint (i.e., does 
the mathematical creation help solve the initial problem?) and contingency (our 
mathematics could be different if our lives demanded it). In this way, Dewey’s con-
ceptualization of mathematics as inescapably psychological in nature can be used 
to lessen the tension between the oppositional forces in contemporary math wars. 
It is a means to reasonably link mathematics to human activity, making it more 
likely that mathematics education can explicitly address broader human aims such 
as democratic participation. This possibility of a democratic mathematics educa-
tion will be explored later in this article.  
Dewey’s descriptive account of how children come to know mathematical 
concepts centered on the mental activities of children as they encountered various 
empirical situations. The psychological processes he detailed explained how it is 
that ideas of “much” and “many” might lead to the more refined notions of “how 
much?” and “how many?” Dewey (1895) indicted that this simple sense of quan-
tity originated from the human need to measure in order to live more efficient and 
better lives (p. 42). 
Dewey saw the commonly understood distinction between counting and mea-
suring as getting in the way of understandings of how children organically come to 
know number. Counting is typically thought to relate to determining how many 
of something there are, while measuring is thought to involve the determination 
of how much of something there is. In other words, the question is whether some 
phenomenon is a series of parts of one whole or a related group made up of indi-
vidual units. Dewey’s pragmatic answer was that the phenomenon may be either 
depending on context and the needs of the counter or measurer. The reason for 
engaging in the mathematical activity must be taken into account when answer-
ing the question. 
Thus, Deweyan mathematics can only be defined and understood by its use. 
The concept of a particular number (say three) does not reside within a group of 
three apples, beanbags, or any other objects any more than it does in the symbol, 
3. Three, as a construct, emerges from activities requiring quantification (measur-
ing) as a means to an end. Dewey and McLellan’s accompanying pedagogy accord-
ingly focused on measurement, as all counting is measuring and all measuring is 
counting. Making measurement the vehicle for mathematical explorations ensured, 
according to Dewey, that number symbols remain linked to concrete units and 
encourage active, empirically oriented, and contextualized conceptions of math-
ematical enterprises. Thus, Dewey’s version of mathematics emphasized the inter-
play between empirical objects and our actions; it acknowledged the role of human 
E&C  ◆  Education and Culture
34   ◆   Kurt Stemhagen and Jason W. Smith
intent in the construction of mathematical knowledge.  To Dewey, the development 
of mathematics is driven by the ways in which we use it—that is, its functions.  
The Possibilities of Democratic Mathematics Education
A primary benefit of adopting a pragmatic, human-oriented understanding of 
mathematics is that mathematics class no longer bears the burden of being the 
place where students attempt to gain access to certain Truths. Instead, the starting 
points for mathematical inquiry are the multiple live issues that students possess; 
mathematics becomes the set of tools from which they can choose to help carry 
out their inquiries. In this type of mathematics class, the teacher becomes a skilled 
guide who can help shape student inquiries, aiding in the construction of math-
ematical models and the selection of appropriate mathematical tools of inquiry and 
in supervising the evaluation of such activities. Such an activity is detailed in War-
nick and Stemhagen (2007).5 Next, a brief description of the activity is presented 
followed by a consideration of the potential for the activity to serve as a model of 
democratic mathematics education. 
Weighted formulas are the featured mathematics in this activity. While there 
is a certain amount of up-front work that is required, the ultimate goal of the ac-
tivity is to give students the opportunity to use this set of mathematical tools to 
explore areas of interest and also to give students enough experience with quanti-
tative rating systems to see that despite our everyday perceptions of mathematics, 
human subjectivity is still present in such endeavors. A teacher could begin with a 
discussion of how we often attempt to quantify our qualitative experiences in order 
to evaluate or compare them. Grading is an obvious and accessible example. Stu-
dents can discuss how some facets of their school experiences are more quantifi-
able than others; say, multiple choice tests as compared to classroom participation. 
The discussion might lead to ideas about how to quantify classroom participation, 
from the crude (raw number of in-class student responses) to the somewhat more 
sophisticated (triangulation between raw responses, a teacher-completed qual-
ity of response rubric, and a student’s Likert-scale self-evaluation, for example). 
At this point, it should be evident that in spite of its quantification, subjectivity is 
still probably inevitable in the grading process and that a good system, rather than 
eliminating it, will minimize it and perhaps even use it to an advantage.
Now that the stage has been set, students might practice with existing quan-
tified evaluation systems using weighted formulae. In Warnick and Stemhagen 
(2007), the National Football League’s quarterback rating system is presented, but 
any number of systems could work, from the simple— for example, the popular 
cooking show Iron Chef ’s three criteria rating system, to the complex—say ELO, the 
chess ability evaluation system (Batchelder & Bershad, 1979). Students next might 
brainstorm phenomena that they have an interest in rating. They could work in 
groups or individually, and once they have decided upon a topic, they are one short 
example away from bringing to bear the mathematical tools related to weighted 
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formulae on topics of their interest. The teacher might use a student-generated topic 
or perhaps a topic of the teacher’s interest to devise and experiment with one such 
model. Heaton, Stemhagen, and Burbach (2000) provide a discussion of the effec-
tive use of weighted formula to rate popular songs in Algebra I classrooms. As such, 
it can serve as a guide for teacher planning for such an exploration.          
In the culminating segment of this activity, students construct their own 
quantification systems in order to evaluate phenomena of their own choosing. They 
select the topic, choose the criteria, and decide on appropriate weights for each 
criterion. Next, they devise a plan to try out their creations. For example, with a 
song-rating system, a student could select a number of songs, order them from fa-
vorite to least favorite and then plug the data for each into the system. The degree 
to which the nonquantified ordering matches the results of running each through 
the system could suggest a successful rating system. Disappointing results could 
send students back to the drawing board to tweak their system. Students could work 
together in teams while engaging in the project of testing and improving the evalu-
ation systems. Perhaps certain criteria were given inordinate weight in the system 
and the formula’s coefficients will require revision or perhaps the categories of cri-
teria themselves failed to capture what was truly important about the thing being 
measured. The point here is that students should have the opportunity to engage in 
complex mathematical thinking and, in the process, to use mathematics as a mode 
of self-expression and to adjust the mathematical tools they create in order to hone 
their modes of self-expression.
The activity described above is but one example of a democratically aimed 
mathematics education. We are not claiming that, implemented in isolation, it 
will radically alter the way in which our students live in the world. Instead, we are 
attempting to show what school mathematics might look like if the broader edu-
cational aim of democracy is taken seriously. Just as no one activity in civics class 
is expected to create fully formed democratic participants, the weighted formula 
activity could serve as just one of many well-conceived activities in a democrati-
cally oriented school mathematics experience. Space prohibits lengthy treatment 
of additional activities, so the short description of one additional activity that fol-
lows is presented to suggest the fuller set of participatory school mathematics ex-
periences we envision.
The visual depiction of mathematics, often by way of graphing, is a recur-
rent theme of school mathematics curricula from elementary through high school.6 
Rather than simply learning to graph mathematical relationships, as is often all 
that is required according to current state standards, students could be required to 
consider a set of data from a particular vantage point and then represent the data 
visually in a way that would best forward the interests of one coming from the 
particular vantage point. Purposeful selection of graphing techniques can allow 
for the same data to be presented in very different ways. Engaging in this sort of 
mathematical activity not only builds mathematical skills but also allows students 
to explore the ways in which mathematics might be used as a form of persuasion. 
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Certainly, coming to grips with the potential political uses of mathematics is an 
important facet of a democratic mathematics education. 
Taking the activity one step further—having groups of students represent 
different interests, as they interpret and visually depict the same data—could lead 
into the very social mathematical activity of debating which depictions are most 
accurate and objective, which do the best of job of forwarding the interests of those 
from the vantage point from which they were assigned, etc. In this way, math-
ematical skills are learned in context, allowing for their human elements and their 
democratic possibilities to be considered. 
One example of possible sources of such data could be global oil production 
numbers presented from the points of view of major producing nations, major con-
suming nations, oil companies, environmental groups, and individual consumers. 
The point here is that various stakeholders have an interest in using mathematics for 
various purposes; and to the degree that students get to try this idea out, not only 
will they become more savvy users of mathematics but they will also, presumably, 
become more savvy consumers of mathematics. A robust version of a democratic 
mathematics education has a place for both skill sets.  
Conclusion
Consonant with Dewey’s distinction between the externally interactive and inter-
nally cohesive requirements of democracy, the analysis of the sample activity as an 
example of democratic mathematics education in this final section is divided into 
two sections. 
External interaction
There are certainly current examples of mathematics education and mathemat-
ics education research that address issues of social justice. We believe that these 
endeavors are commendable. Furthermore, such efforts are particularly valuable 
when, in promoting social justice, students come to recognize that freer interac-
tion is not only okay, but desirable and even necessary given our democratic social 
arrangements. That said, when socially conscious mathematics education fails to 
rise above mere mechanical treatment of data for the purpose of exposing social 
justice it runs the risk of raising awareness of social issues without subsequent cul-
tivation of the students’ desire and ability to act in such ways as to change their 
social habits.7 In other words, becoming aware of social inequalities is a neces-
sary but not sufficient step in democratic education. Students also need to come 
to grips with their own agency and the role they can play in social improvement. 
Neither the weighted formula activity nor the sketch of the second activity, in and 
of themselves, accomplishes all of our democratic goals (i.e., becoming aware of 
social inequality and recognizing and acting on personal agency). However, taken 
together, one can begin to see a school mathematics experience that might work 
toward democratic ends.   
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Dewey presents logic and psychology as modes by which we undertake the 
act of living our lives. The recognition, emulation, and formulation of practical 
methods of inquiry humanize logic and incorporate mental processes related to how 
we think and live. His conception of mathematics education helps to demonstrate 
how it is that we can actually change social habits. Conceiving of mathematics as 
measurement allows the participant to see mathematics as a practical activity con-
nected to a personally meaningful end. This contextual approach to mathematics 
emphasizes the importance of human intent in the construction of mathematical 
knowledge. Human intent presupposes a perception of the significance or connect-
edness of activity, which develops an individual’s ability to modify the means they 
employ. The activities presented in this article demonstrate the human intentional 
facets of mathematics, the ways in which mathematics can be used to empower 
individuals, and the ways in which mathematics can relate to and even impact 
personally meaningful aims or ends. Democratic societies must educate members 
for this kind of personal initiative and adaptability if it is to promote social mo-
bility and the adjustment of social habits. A Deweyan approach can help increase 
the likelihood that mathematics class will be able to participate in this project of 
democratic education.  
Internal cohesion
Developing individuals’ propensity to act according to individual initiative and 
adaptability is one aspect of educating for democracy; there is also a social aspect 
of Dewey’s democratic education that must be considered. Many constructivist 
mathematics reformers encourage a human understanding of mathematics through 
individual psychological cohesion. But this perspective often fails to adequately 
present the social experience of life, and specifically, of lived mathematics. Dewey 
presents a social and practical understanding of cohesion that turns the psychologi-
cally oriented constructivist’s understanding of cohesion on its head. According to 
Dewey’s pragmatic view of social life, cohesion involves more than the individual 
testing of a hypothesis and its adherence to an experientially constructed under-
standing of the world. In order to promote a democratic mathematics education in 
keeping with Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, cohesion must also involve meaning-
ful action based on shared interests. 
According to Dewey (1916), social cohesion within a democracy should flow 
naturally from multiple, varied points of common interest. Therefore, democratic 
mathematics education must go beyond proofs and other externally directed exer-
cises designed to help students grasp abstract, external realities. It must also go be-
yond assessing development only at the individual unit of analysis and also consider 
that of the group. The pursuit of democratic education requires the implementation 
of mathematics education in such a way that the social dimensions of cohesion are 
also experienced. In other words, one of the criteria for the measure of mathemat-
ics education should be the extent to which its practice creates opportunities for 
students to measure areas of shared interest so that they can understand the aims 
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of their work, adapt their means to appropriately fit the context, and learn about 
the nature of collective living and the worth of collective action. From the outset, 
the social dimensions of the weighted formula activity are clear. Rather than just 
doing the “same old math” in groups, the activity provides opportunities for stu-
dents to listen, learn from, and work with one another.
The activity and related discussion are offered in the spirit of just one possi-
bility suggested by a Deweyan approach to mathematics and mathematics educa-
tion. To the degree that students can come to understand mathematics as a means 
by which to improve social and physical situations—that is, to act on and live well 
in the world—mathematics class can be an agent of democratic education. Help-
ing children to acknowledge and value their potential agency should be an aim of 
all democratic educational pursuits and a Deweyan reconceptualization of math-
ematics could provide a conceptual foundation toward that end.    
Notes
1.  There are too many to include. See, for a few examples, Banks (2004), Beane (2005), 
Carlson (2002), Greene (1988), Noddings (2003), and Postman (1995). 
2.  We don’t want to overstate Dewey’s influence on the day-to-day operation of P-12 
public education, as we believe, following Tozer, Violas, & Senese (2002) and Kohn (2000) 
that the efficiency progressives have had much more lasting (and often pernicious) influence 
on schooling. That said, Dewey is often cited in academic work in most curricular areas, but 
not so often in mathematics education.  
3.  Hersh (1997) writes of this philosophical split, dividing absolutism into Platonist 
and formalist camps and describing the other side of the divide as humanism (this is more 
or less what we refer to as constructivism). 
4.  Rough empirical data supports this claim that mathematics education faces addi-
tional obstacles (beyond the standards and high-stakes tests facing all areas) in implement-
ing a democratic education. A quick ERIC search revealed 101 articles linking mathematics 
and democracy.  Other content areas had much higher totals (social studies 2086, Language 
Arts/English approximately 1000, and Science 859).   
5.  The activity is presented elsewhere in order to accentuate the moral dimensions and 
possibilities of mathematics education.  The ties between its moral and democratic facets 
certainly would not be surprising to Dewey, as Dewey’s corpus of work implicitly assumed 
a connection between the two.  For explicit discussion of the links between morality and 
democracy see Dewey’s (1955) Democracy as a moral ideal.      
6.  For example, see http://www.doe.virginia.gov/go/Sols/mathsecondary.doc. 
7.  Gutstein’s (2006) Reading and writing the world through mathematics is an example 
of the sort of mathematics education that seeks to empower students as they learn mathemat-
ics. Thus, it is not simply mechanical treatment of data and meets an important criterion of 
democratic mathematics education. 
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